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SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS
DEE MARTIN GALLIGARt
THE past two decades have witnessed an impressive increase in the ulitiza-
tion" of subordination agreements. Indeed, in modern corporate financing, the
subordination agreement has become almost commonplace, albeit a complex
instrument surrounded by misconception and confusion. Nevertheless, the
basic concept of a subordination agreement is simple: It is the subordination
of the right to receive payment of certain indebtedness (the subordinated
debt 1) to the prior payment of certain other indebtedness (the senior debt)
of the same debtor. Put another way-in the circumstances specified in the
subordination agreement, the senior debt must be paid in full before payment
may be made on the subordinated debt and retained by the subordinating
creditor.
One type of subordination agreement is typified in corporate issues of sub-
ordinated bonds and debentures; while the other basic type is most often used
in connection with bank loans to corporate borrowers. The expansion in the
volume of both these forms of corporate financing has contributed to the in-
creased employment of the subordination agreement.
Starting in the late 30's and early 40's with issues by sales finance and
small loan companies, spreading to the oil and chemical industries, thence to
the industrials and most recently to the public utilities, subordinated bond
and debenture issues have proved their ability to supply the needs of expand-
ing companies. For the corporation which desires leverage in its financial
set-up, subordinated securities are superior in many instances to preferred
stock issues, or, at the least, a valuable alternative therefor as a source of
funds. Moreover, since these issues are regarded by senior debt holders as
equity capital rather than debt,2 they furnish an equity base upon which
may properly rest a commensurate increase in the issuing corporation's
ability to obtain short-term bank financing. In fact, from the point of view
of the bank (the senior creditor), subordinated debt is preferable to equity
tMember of the New York Bar. The author is indebted to Grenville S. Sewall, Esq.
and John D. Van Cott, Esq. for materials furnished in the preparation of this article
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1. The term "subordinated debt" means the indebtedness which is subordinated. Al-
ternative terms in current use are "junior debt" and "inferior debt." "Senior debt" means
the indebtedness for the benefit of and to which the subordinated debt is subordinated. Al-
ternatives to senior debt are "superior debt," "prior debt," (not in time) and, in certain
cases where the senior debt is held by banks, "bank debt." The term "debtor" refers to the
common debtor, i.e., the borrower from the senior debt holder (sometimes called the "senior
creditor" or "the holder of the senior debt") and from the subordinating creditor ("the
subordinator" or "the holder of the subordinated debt"). Either debt may have been in-
curred prior in time to the other.
2. 10 J. OF FNANcE 1? 10 (1955).
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capital,3 since in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy the senior creditor will
receive "double dividends" out of the bankrupt's estate--the dividends paid
on the senior debt and, by reason of the subordination agreement provisions
requiring them to be turned over to the senior creditor, the dividends paid
on the subordinated debt. For example, assume that a bankrupt company has
$600,000 of assets and has outstanding $500,000 of senior debt, $500,000 of
subordinated debt, and $500,000 of other debt. On a distribution of all the
assets of the company the senior debt would receive $400,000-the $200,000
dividend paid on the senior debt plus the $200,000 dividend paid on the sub-
ordinated debt-and the other debt would receive $200,000. If the subor-
dinated debt had been preferred stock, however, the senior debt would have
received only $300,000, with the remaining $300,000 being paid on the other
debt.
Those corporations which, either by choice or circumstance, do not or
cannot issue their obligations to the public or place them with institutional
investors, will most likely turn to commercial banks for relatively short-term
financing. Typically, in the case of a small corporation seeking financing from
its local bank, whether for working capital, plant expansion, or other pur-
poses, a condition of the bank's commitment may be the subordination of any
loans by the corporation's principals or suppliers to the prior payment of the
bank loan. The junior creditor will often be willing to have the debt owed
him subordinated if the effective functioning of the debtor's business is de-
pendent upon obtaining the additional financing. In other cases the bank may
require that the corporation obtain subordinated loans from stockholders or
other willing creditors. This type of subordination agreement would most like-
ly provide that so long as any bank loan is outstanding these creditors may
not be paid.
Currently, and unhappily, it cannot be said that those persons expert in
this field always agree on the content or even the structure of subordination
agreements. The reason for this confusion is the dearth of decisional law and
the surprising absence of other writings on this subject.
This article will explore the two basic types of subordinati9n agreements,
the legal theories under which they are enforced, some drafting pitfalls which
face those executing such agreements, and legal problems which may arise
notwithstanding careful drafting of subordination agreements.
TYPES OF SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS
There are two basic types of subordination agreements. The "inchoate"
type of subordination is so drawn that it does not become operative until a
voluntary or involuntary distribution of assets of the debtor is made to its
creditors; the specific event which triggers the subordination, such as bank-
3. Of course, an economic difference to the debtor between equity capital and subor-
dinated debt is the fact that interest paid on subordinated debt would be an income tax
deduction available to the debtor.
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ruptcy or insolvency, will be specified in the agreement. Until such financial
distress occurs, the subordinated debt may be amortized, payments may be
made to a sinking fund therefor, or the subordinated debt may be redeemed
or refunded by the debtor through other means, subject only to the specific
limitations imposed by the instrument providing for or evidencing such debt.
The inchoate type of subordination is, therefore, the most advantageous from
the point of view of the subordinator and, because the junior debt may have
been redeemed by the time insolvency strikes the debtor, the least beneficial
to the senior creditor.
The other type is the "complete" subordination agreement, under which
no payment of principal or interest on the subordinated debt is permitted so
long as the debtor is obligated to the senior creditor, or so long as a specifi-
cally identified senior debt remains unpaid. Variations on the complete sub-
ordination may be obtained by merely limiting payment on the subordinated
debt to a specified amount until the senior debt is retired, rather than pro-
hibiting such payments entirely. Likewise, the inchoate agreement may be
made more stringent, for example, by prohibiting payments to the subor-
dinator during the continuance of any default in payment of the senior debt,
rather than waiting until actual bankruptcy of the debtor.
The inchoate type of agreement is often found in corporate indentures
which provide for subordinated bond or debenture issues. The beneficiaries
of such a subordination are all of a particular class or classes of creditors,
such as banks, other institutional lenders, or even all other creditors.
The complete subordination is more often drawn in favor of a particular
creditor, or relating to 9 particular senior debt. An example is the printed
bank form drawn in favor of the bank as to then outstanding and future loans
by the bank to the debtor.
Under both types of subordination agreements, upon the distribution of the
assets of the debtor, the senior debt must be paid in full before any payment
is made on the subordinated debt, and all payments or distributions on the
subordinated debt which would otherwise be paid to the holder of that debt
must be paid over directly to the holder of the senior debt. Thus, both the
inchoate and the complete subordinations have the practical effect of making
the subordinated debt a type of security for the senior debt, available to the
senior creditor upon a distribution of the assets of the debtor. However, in
the case of the inchoate subordination, the "security," may decrease or even
vanish because payments are permitted on the subordinated debt. In the case
of the complete subordination, however, the subordinated debt is "locked-in"
and its distributional value in bankruptcy becomes, in effect, just as much a
security benefiting the senior debt holder as would, for example, a chattel
mortgage in the hands of the foreclosing mortgagee.
Evaluation of the "security" will, of course, require a complex analysis of
the proportionate relationship between senior debt, subordinated debt, other
debt, security for any such debt, and equity capital to determine the extent to





The usual inchoate subordinated bonds and debentures include the word
"Subordinate" in their titles; a short paragraph will recite the fact of sub-
ordination, refer to the indenture under which they have been issued for a
complete statement of the subordination provisions, and state that the holder,
by accepting the bond or debenture, agrees to and becomes bound by such
provisions.
4
The inchoate subordination is then implemented by a provision such as:
In the event of any distribution, division or application, partial or com-
plete, voluntary or involuntary, by operation of law or otherwise, of all
or any part of the assets of the Company (the issuer), or the proceeds
thereof, in whatever form, to creditors of the Company, or upon any in-
debtedness of the Company, by reason of the liquidation, dissolution or
other winding up of the Company or the Company's business, or any
sale, receivership, insolvency or bankruptcy proceeding, or assignment
for the benefit of creditors, or any proceeding by or against the Company
for any relief under any bankruptcy or insolvency lav or laws relating
to the relief of debtors, readjustment of indebtedness, reorganizations,
compositions or extensions, then and in any such event, any payment or
distribution of any kind or character, either in cash, securities or other
property, which shall be payable or deliverable upon or with respect to
any or all of the Debentures 5 shall be paid or delivered direct to the
holders of the Senior Indebtedness for application on said Senior In-
debtedness, until said Senior Indebtedness shall first have been fully paid
and satisfied and before any payment is made on the Debentures.
Taken literally, this clause would require that, in a reorganization of the
debtor, any securities received by subordinated debt holders would have to be
turned over to the senior debt holder. But, should the plan of reorganization
provide that mortgage bonds, preferred stock, or similar higher class security,
be issued to the senior debt holder and that common' stock be issued to the
subordinated debt holder (thus giving effect to the subordination), the latter
should not be required, in terms of the intent of the subordination agreement,
4. Typical language for inchoate subordination provisions appearing in corporate in-
dentures is :
The indebtedness evidenced by the Debentures and the payment of the principal of
and premium, if any, and interest thereon shall be subordinate and subject in right
of payment, to the extent and in the manner hereinafter set forth, to the prior pay-
ment in full of all Senior Indebtedness, whether now outstanding or hereafter in-
curred, and each holder of Debentures, or any coupon, by his acceptance thereof,
agrees to and shall be bound by the provisions of this Article.
5. If the issuer of subordinated indebtedness is permitted to issue junior subordinated
indebtedness, i.e., indebtedness which would be subordinated to the principal subordinated
indebtedness (the subordinated debentures), a clause along the following lines would be
inserted at this point:
including any such payment or distribution which may be payable or deliverable by
virtue of the provisions of any securities which are subordinate and junior in right
of payment to the Debentures ....
1 1]
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to turn the common stock over to the senior debt holder. To meet just such
a possibility, some institutional purchasers of subordinated securities have
insisted on a clause excepting from the above-quoted provision "any such
payment or distribution authorized by an order or decree giving effect, and
stating in such order or decree that effect is given, to the subordination of
the Subordinated Indebtedness to the Senior Indebtedness, and made by a
court of competent jurisdiction in a reorganization proceeding under any
applicable bankruptcy law." This is often coupled with another exception
covering "any such payment or distribution of securities which are subordi-
nate and junior to the payment of all Senior Indebtedness then outstanding."
Some of the larger bank lenders prefer instead something like the follow-
ing as a modification of the "turn-over" clause:
*.. but subject to the power of a court of competent jurisdiction to make
other equitable provision reflecting the rights conferred in this Note [the
subordinated debt instrument] upon the Senior Indebtedness and the
holders thereof with respect to the subordinated indebtedness represented
hereby and the holder thereof by a lawful plan of reorganization under
applicable bankruptcy law.
A glaring defect to the full realization of the senior creditor's benefits is in-
herent in the inchoate subordination. From the practical point of view, prob-
ably one of the least successful ways for a creditor to collect money from a
debtor is to put the debtor into bankruptcy. Thus, creditors are reluctant to
take that step which is essential to the full effectuation of the inchoate subor-
dination. One way of alleviating this hardship, from the point of view of the
senior creditor, is to have the indenture provide that during the continuance
of any default in the payment of either principal of or interest on the senior
debt, no payment (whether of principal, interest, premium, or to a sinking
fund) will be made on the subordinated debt. Thus, the subordination would
become operative upon the occurrence of any such default prior to bankruptcy.
When bankruptcy of the debtor ensues, it is obviously important that there
be as great an amount of assets as possible available for senior creditors.
Since the inchoate type of subordination does not become effective until the
debtor is in financial trouble, and regular payments on the subordinated debt
are usually permitted until then, it may well be that the subordinated debt
will have been completely retired by the time the trouble develops. Bank
senior creditors, therefore, often include in loan agreements provisions which
limit payments or prepayments of the subordinated debt to an agreed basis;
this will have the effect of keeping the subordinated debt in existence for a
longer time. From the point of view of the subordinator, however, a limitation
on payment on the subordinated debt on conditions which the subordinator
may not know exist might well be objectionable. For example, such a limita-
tion based on earnings of the debtor might result in a payment on the sub-
ordinated debt being received by the junior creditor in good faith, only to
have to disgorge it later because of it having been made in violation of the
terms of the senior bank loan agreement.
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In many cases, at the time a corporation requests short-term financing from
a bank, the corporation may already have outstanding subordinated bonds or
debentures. Upon a review of the indenture pursuant to which these bonds
or debentures were issued, the bank may find that some of these desired pro-
visions, such as the limits on the payment of the junior debt, are not included
in the indenture. To attain a satisfactory senior creditor position the bank may
then -require that the substance of the missing clauses be provided by way of
covenants in the senior debt instrument. To enforce such covenants, the
senior debt instrument would provide for the acceleration of the senior debt
upon the violation by the debtor of any of such covenants. Almost invariably
the senior debt instrument will also provide for such acceleration if "the sub-
ordinated debt or any part thereof shall become due and payable by involun-
tary acceleration of maturity thereof."
Complete Subordinations
Most subordination agreements of the complete type are entered into for
the express benefit of, and are addressed to, the holder of the senior indebted-
ness. A complete subordination agreement can take the form of a three party
agreement (i.e., the bank, the borrower, and the subordinator), or an agree-
ment signed only by the subordinator and the debtor, or, as in most cases, an
instrument addressed to a particular bank and signed only by the subordi-
nator. In some forms the debtor signs a short form of acceptance or agree-
ment provided at the foot of the instrument. The printed bank form is par-
ticularly appropriate when the subordinator is an officer, director, or stock-
holder of the borrowing corporation since it is unlikely the agreement will
,require revision to reflect the intent of the parties. When the subordinator
is a general creditor, and especially when the subordination agreement is be-
ing negotiated in connection with a bank loan then being made to the debtor,
the agreement usually takes the three party form.
Very often the complete subordination agreement takes the form of a con-
tinuing agreement covering then existing and all future indebtedness of the
debtor to the subordinator, and it will subordinate such indebtedness to both
existing and future financial accommodations of the bank to the borrower.6
Such an agreement will provide for termination only after due notice is given
to the bank and only as to loans and extensions of credit made by the bank
to the borrower after the bank's receipt of such notice of termination.
6. In Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Erickson, 117 F2d 796, 799 (9th
Cir. 1941), the subordination agreement in issue did not specifically provide for the sub-
ordination of the subordinated debt to future indebtedness of the debtor to the senior cred-
itors. The following dictum of the court on this point is interesting:
The agreement of the two officers was to subordinate until all other obligations of
the debtor, 'including interest accrued and to accrue thereon, have been fully paid,
satisfied and discharged whether through bankruptcy... or other means ... ' The
agreement was to continue for a specific period; and a fair construction of the lan-
guage and pur.1pose of, the contract obliges us to conclude that the claims were sub-
ordinated to all legitimate debts of the corporation, whether present or prospective.
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Many bank subordinations of the complete type provide that in the event
of any violation of the subordination agreement by either the subordinating
creditor or the debtor, the senior debt becomes immediately due and payable.
Carrying this a bit farther, such subordination agreements often provide that
the senior debt will become due and payable upon the involuntary accelera-
tion of the subordinated debt. Such a provision might appear to be contra-
dictory to another typical provision: that the subordination provisions are to
be definitive only of the rights of the senior creditor and the subordinator
and that the obligation of the debtor to pay the subordinated debt in accord-
ance with its terms is not to be impaired. There is no contradiction, however,
as between the debtor and the subordinating creditor. The subordinated debt
is still due and payable according to its terms. It is by reason of the sub-
ordination by the subordinating creditor running in favor of the senior cred-
itor that payments on the subordinated debt are deferred in accordance with
the terms of the subordination agreement. The acceleration provision relates
to involuntary acceleration of the subordinated debt or the payment of the
subordinated debt at its stated maturity in violation of the subordination pro-
visions requiring that no such payment be made. In other words, although
the junior creditor will not be paid until the senior debt has been satisfied,
the obligation of the debtor to pay the junior debt according to its tenor
remains, but the junior creditor cannot enforce that obligation. The junior
creditor cannot receive his payments because of his agreement with the senior
creditor, and not because his debtor's obligation has been impaired.
Although most complete subordinations provide that no payment of the
subordinated debt will be made to the subordinator, there are lesser degrees
of complete subordination agreements. Many agreements, for example, per-
mit the payment of interest on the subordinated debt so long as the borrower
is not in default under any of the senior debt instruments. Various exemp-
tions may be carved out from the subordination. 7
Most bank subordination agreements contain provisions covering the fol-
lowing additional points: should either the subordinating creditor or the
debtor be a partnership, the agreement is not to be affected by any change
in the partnership; the borrower and the subordinating creditor are to furnish
financial statements of account between them and to permit the bank to
examine their records; notice of acceptance of the agreement by the bank is
waived; failure or delay in exercising rights does not act as a waiver of such
rights; and the state whose laws are to govern is specified.
Inchoate or Complete?
Having distinguished the two basic types of subordination agreements, how
should a court interpret an agreement which fails to make the distinction,
7. For example, payments of principal of the subordinated debt may be permitted in
accordance with a predetermined earnings formula, or from the proceeds of the sale of
certain capital assets or a different issue of subordinated securities.
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and simply states that "debt A is hereby subordinated to debt B ?" On the
one hand, the argument may be advanced that as a matter of language the
word "subordinate" means to place in a lower order or inferior position, and
that the mere use of such word imports a complete type of subordination
which prohibits any payment on the subordinated debt until the senior debt
is fully paid. On this line of reasoning, therefore, additional language is neces-
sary to turn such a complete subordination into an inchoate subordination.
In other words, the subordination provision must also provide specifically
that the subordination is to be effective only in the event of a distribution
of assets of the debtor by reason of bankruptcy, insolvency, or other dissolu-
tion or liquidation proceeding. The opposing argument, that only an inchoate
s ubordination is created by the simple provision mentioned above and that
additional language is necessary to create a complete subordination, has as
its basis the view that the word "subordinate" has no meaning in law ex-
cept as the cases have delineated the concept of subordination. The argument
continues: the cases have arisen only in bankruptcy matters, where the courts
have sustained the validity of subordinations to the extent only that dividends
payable on the subordinated debt out of the assets of the bankrupt are turned
over to the senior debt holder. A dictum in In re Aktieboleget Kreuger &
Toll 8 can be cited: "Subordination to the general creditors of the participat-
ing debentures would be meaningless in a solvent corporation . . "9 It is
clear that there is no real authority supporting either side of the argument-
the law has not progressed to that point. The argument serves only to em-
phasize the need for well-drawn subordination agreements.
THEORIES OF VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY
There is no doubt that subordination agreements of both types are valid
agreements between the parties and will be enforced by the courts. Most of
the cases on the subject have arisen in bankruptcy proceedings. Although
the decisions evidence different theories upon which enforcement rests, in
every case save one 10 the subordination agreement was enforced, and the
8. 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938).
9. Id. at 770.
10. Matter of Goodman-Kinstler Cigar Co., 32 Am. Bankr. R. 624 (S.D. Cal. 1914).
In this one exception the Bankruptcy Referee held that an inartistic attempt to subordi-
nate (the would-be subordinator having endorsed at the foot of a financial statement ad-
dressed to a lending bank by a debtor who subsequently became bankrupt an agreement
"that you [the bank] are to be paid in full before we receive anything on our account")
did "not have the effect of an assignment, legal or equitable' of the claim of the claimant
[the would-be subordinator] against the bankrupt or of any dividends that might be de-
clared thereon." Id. at 625-26. The Referee declared that an essential element to an equi-
table assignment, that of an actual appropriation of a fund sought to be assigned, was
lacking. He also was of the view that "the bankruptcy court should not be involved in the
enforcement of a covenant between the bank and the claimant which does not amount to
an quitable assignment, and the bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction to enforce such a
covenant," and advised the bank to "take its cause of action.., to -a State Court and try
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dividends paid from the bankrupt estate on the subordinated claims were al-
located to the senior debt.
Four separate theories of enforceability have evolved:
(1) The subordination agreement creates an equitable lien in favor of the
senior creditor;"
(2) The subordination agreement creates an equitable assignment to the
senior creditor of the subordinated debt claim in bankruptcy and dividends
payable thereon;12
(3) The subordinator holds the dividends received as constructive trustee
for the holder of the senior debt ;13
(4) The bankruptcy court has the power to distribute the bankrupt estate
in accord with the rights of the parties as fixed by their own contract. 14
The basic rationale which appears from all the cases is that a bankruptcy
court, being "a court of equity, with all the necessary powers to ascertain and
determine the rights of persons in and upon the property and assets sur-
rendered by the bankrupt"' 5 will do equity between the parties so long as
public policy and the Bankruptcy Act are not violated.
The Equitable Lien Theory
The equitable lien theory of enforcement of subordination agreements was
succinctly stated by Judge Learned Hand in In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son,10
in 1926. In this case, at a meeting between the subsequently bankrupt cor-
it there." Id. at 628. This holding, cited in an unreported case, It re Delpark, Inc., Bank-
rupt, In Bankruptcy No. 51899, S.D.N.Y., 1937, was therein criticized by Judge Coffey
as one which "is along purely legalistic lines, overlooks substance and, in principle, is at
variance with what this court has determined in In re Geo. R. Schinzel & Son, Inc., 16 F.2d
289 (S.D.N.Y. 1926)." See also, Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371 (8th Cir.
1935), in which the "remarks of the referee" in the Goodman-Kinstler case were rejected.
The Goodman-Kinstler decision is not good law.
11. Searle v. Mechanics' Loan & Trust Co., 249 Fed. 942 (9th Cir. 1918); It re Geo.
P. Schinzel & Son, Inc., 16 F.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
12. It re Handy-Andy Community Stores, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1932).
13. In the Matter of Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co., 148 F. Supp. 647 (D.C. N.H.
1956), aff'd sub iom. Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co. v. Delaware Mills, Inc., 244 F.2d 314
(1st Cir. 1957).
14. Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1935) ; It re Aktiebolaget
Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938) ; !It re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F. Supp.
107 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd in Elias v. Clarke, 143 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1944) (a reorganiza-
tion under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n v. Erickson, 117 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1941); In the Matter of Delpark, Inc., Bank-
rupt, In Bankruptcy, No. 51899, S.D.N.Y., 1937; St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Champion
Shoe Mach. Co., 109 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1940) ; see it re George C. Bruns Co., 256 Fed.
840 (7th Cir. 1919) (where, in a composition, the court enforced a guarantee of payment
as a subordination).
15. In re Handy-Andy Community Stores, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 97, 98 (W.D. La. 1932).
See also Annot., 100 A.L.R. 660 (1936).
16. 16 F2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
[Vol. 70:376
SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS
poration and a number of its creditors, some, but not all, of the creditors
executed an agreement with the bankrupt under which persons supplying
goods to the bankrupt were to have a priority over the claims existing at the
time of the agreement. In refusing to sustain the Referee's order disallowing
a claim by the suppliers for priority, Judge Hand said of these creditors:
When former creditors continued to sell to the bankrupt, they got no
pledge or mortgage as security; if they have any similar right, it must
be by an equitable lien.
and of the creditors who signed the agreement:
By signing the agreement, such creditors intended that the supplying
creditors should have the first call on any payments made, and from this
arose an equitable claim as against the signing creditors."
The equitable lien theory was also utilized in Searle v. Mechanics' Loan
& Trust Co.'8 to hold those junior creditors who signed a subordination
agreement to their bargain. Although by its terms the agreement never went
into effect because the required 90 per cent of the creditors of the bankrupt
failed to sign it,19 the signing creditors were estopped from objecting since
they and all other parties believed that the agreement had become effective
and funds to carry on the bankrupt's business had been advanced by the
senior creditors over a period of five months. The court held:
Owing to the fact that not all of the creditors of the bankrupt signed
the trust agreement, the appellees' lien was not enforceable against the
whole of the fund realized on the disposition of the bankrupt's estate.
But clearly the creditors who actually signed the agreement thereby
created an equitable lien on their interest in the funds which thereafter
came into the control of the bankrupt court for administration. That
court had jurisdiction to protect the lien claimants in the distribution
of the funds payable as dividends 20
It should be observed that the court had no hesitancy in assuming that
the bankruptcy court had sufficient jurisdiction to determine the rights to the
bankrupt estate and all controversies relating to the estate.
The Equitable Assignment Theory
The equitable assignment theory has been used only in In re Handy-Andy
Community Stores, Inc.21 There, two individual creditors, being also officers
and stockholders of the principal debtor, which subsequently became bank-
rupt, in order to induce the bank to purchase a $15,000 note of the bankrupt,
agreed with the bank that "we, as individual creditors of said corporation,
17. Ibid.
18. 249 Fed. 942 (9th Cir. 1918).
19. Id. at 944.
20. Id. at 945.
21. 2 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1932).
19611
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
should agree to subordinate our claim for said $20,000 to yours for $15,000
in respect of all assets of the corporation . . . and that in the event of insol-
vency or liquidation, your note aforesaid shall be paid as between you and us
by preference and priority, over our claim."'22 The individual subordinators
further agreed in case of bankruptcy to file their claim and make the "proper
assignment thereof, should the same become necessary." When bankruptcy
ensued, the bank claimed to be entitled to receive dividends on the subordi-
nated claims of the individual creditors by reason of the subordination agree-
ment. The individuals opposed this claim on the grounds that the agreement
did not include an assignment and could not be sustained as a subrogation.23
Reversing the Referee's decision, which had supported the junior creditors,
the court said:
While the document does not convey a present title to the claimants, it
amounts to an agreement to do so, in so far as relief in a court of equity
is concerned, which becomes enforceable when the necessary conditions
arise requiring it. For this reason, the legal title to the claims standing
in the names of [the junior creditors], it was entirely proper for them
[the bank] to prove the same before the referee.2 4
The Constructive Trust Theory
The constructive trust theory has been used only in In re Dodge-Freedman
Poultry Co.25 Freedman, the president and principal stockholder of Dodge-
Freedman Poultry Company (the Debtor-Petitioner), in consideration of the
extension of credit by Delaware Mills (Delaware) to the Poultry Company,
executed a subordination agreement with Delaware under which he subor-
dinated all of his claims against the Poultry Company, totaling $50,000, to the
debt owed by the Poultry Company to Delaware, and agreed that no pay-
ments would be made to him until all amounts owing to the senior creditor
had been satisfied. In January 1955, the Poultry Company filed a petition for
an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. The Plan of
Arrangement subsequently adopted provided for a dividend of fifteen per cent
to be paid on all unsecured claims in full satisfaction thereof. One such claim,
proved by Mrs. Freedman, but found by the court to be Freedman's, was the
$50,000 owing to Freedman. Before it was paid, however, Mrs. Freedman, by
affidavit filed under General Order 41 of the Bankruptcy Act, waived her right
to share in the dividend. Freedman's purpose was obvious. By waiving his
claim, he hoped to enable the Poultry Company which he owned and directed
to retain the $7,500 which would otherwise be paid to Delaware. Delaware,
22. Id. at 98.
23. On the subrogation issue the court held: "I do not consider that there is any ques-
tion of subrogation involved, but simply the interpretation and enforcement of a valid
contract which a court of equity under the circumstances revealed here is bound to
respect." Id. at 99.
24. Id. at 98.
25. 148 F. Supp. 647 (D.N.H. 1956).
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having received its fifteen per cent dividend on its own claim, leaving an un-
paid balance in excess of $36,000, filed another proof of claim asserting its
right to a $7,500 dividend (the dividend Freedman would have received had
his claim not been waived) by virtue of the subordination agreement. The
Poultry Company objected to the allowance of this claim. It contended that
the subordination agreement gave Delaware "no property interest in the debt
owed... to Harry Freedman, at least not until such debt was actually paid
to him."20 Delaware, citing Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, contended that
the equity power of a bankruptcy court automatically converts a subordination
agreement into an assignment upon the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
The Referee refused to sanction Freedman's "inequitable and deliberate act of
avoidance" and ruled that Freedman was estopped from voluntarily waiving
his right to a dividend. The Referee found that the subordination agreement
"is and always was an equitable assignment" of Freedman's claim and ordered
the $7,500 dividend thereon paid to Delaware. The court agreed with the
Referee's order but disagreed with his reasoning. It specifically rejected both
the equitable assignment and the equitable lien theories, the former on the
ground that "there was no manifestation of intention, either written, oral, or
by conduct, on the part of Freedman to relinquish control, or to make any
appropriation to Delaware Mills, Inc. ' '27
But the rejection of these theories left the court in a doctrinal dilemma.
The forbearance agreement embodied in the subordination agreement pre-
vented Freedman from collecting dividends on his own behalf as long as Del-
aware's claim remained unsatisfied. By waiving his right to a dividend, how-
ever, Freedman would violate the purpose of the subordination agreement by
returning to the debtor money which both Freedman and Delaware had in-
tended that Delaware, the senior creditor, would receive. The court therefore
ruled that as a subordinating creditor Freedman had the right to collect the
dividend only on behalf of the party equitably entitled to it. In short, Freed-
man was found to be a constructive trustee for Delaware Mills. 28
In the light of the attempt made by the subordinator in Dodge-Freedman
to escape the consequences of his subordination, it might be well to insert in
26. Id. at 649.
27. Id. at 651.
28. The court, for a definition of constructive trust, quotes from 4 ScoTT, TRusTs
§ 462 (2d ed. 1956) as follows:
A constructive trust arises where a person who holds title to property is subject
to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly'
enriched if he were permitted to retain it When a" person holds'the title to'ir6perty
which he is under an obligation to convey to 'another, and when th lobligation
does not arise merely because he has voluntarily assumed it, he is said to hold the
property in constructive trust for the other and he is called a constructive trustee
of the property. He is not compelled to convey the property because he is a con-
structive trustee; it.is because he can be compelled to convey it that he is a con-
structive trustee.
148 F. Supp. at 652.
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future subordination agreements a provision prohibiting waiver, forgiveness,
or cancellation of the subordinated debt.
Further, it would be good practice for the subordination agreement to con-
tain a provision giving the senior creditor power to file proof of claim on the
subordinated indebtedness or to compel the holder of the subordinated debt
to file proof of claim and to assign such claim to the senior creditor. Although,
as a practical matter, it is unlikely that such a provision can be obtained
where the outstanding subordinated debt is publicly held and is represented
by a trustee, there is no sound reason for its absence in a bank subordination
agreement of the complete type. Of course, the objective is to have proof
of claim filed on behalf of the subordinated debt, and as a practical matter
it is most improbable that the holder thereof would not file such proof of
claim. In an extreme case, should the subordinator not so file and the senior
creditor not have power to do so, and should the courts refuse specifically to
order the proof of claim to be filed and the dividend on the subordinated debt
paid over to the senior creditor, the result would be the elimination of the
subordinated debt from any share in the assets of the debtor. This would
place the subordinated debt, vis-A-vis the senior creditor, in the position of
capital stock. Once proof of claim on the subordinated debt is filed, no assign-
ment of the claim would be necessary-the subordination provisions would be
effective to accomplish the payment of the dividend on the subordinated debt
directly to the holder of the senior debt.
The Contract Theory
The theory that the bankruptcy court has the jurisdictional power to en-
force the contractual rights of the parties in interest, when distributing a
bankrupt estate, is the most logically supportable and sensible of all the
theories. A concise expression of this theory appears in the Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Erickson:
The Bankruptcy Court has undoubted power to subordinate a general
claim to other claims in the same category where for any reason, legal
or equitable, it ought to be subordinated. The court may administer the
estate and order its distribution conformably to the rights of creditors as
fixed by their own contracts, if these are lawful. 29
This theory was also adopted in In re Delpark, Inc., in which opinion
Judge Caffey further addressed himself to the jurisdictional question as fol-
lows:
The jurisdiction of this court is adequate. Its exercise is an unavoidable
incident of causing the estate to be distributed and of determining the
controversies in relation to the distribution pursuant to subdivision 7 of
Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act. [Citations] It is not necessary that
there be a plenary suit. All the interested parties were properly before
the court which at the time was engaged in making a distribution. 0
29. 117 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1941).
30. See note 10 supra.
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This is not to say that an equity court will in the first instance entertain a
suit to enforce the payment of money pursuant to contract. In the instances
discussed, the bankruptcy proceeding was in being and the parties were before
the court.
Thus, Collier on Bankruptcy states:
When the worst happens, and bankruptcy distribution ensues, the [sub-
ordination] agreement is presented to the bankruptcy court in support
of a claim to priority in the payment of dividends ahead of creditors who
agreed to be subordinated in liquidation. Such agreements are almost
uniformly enforced by bankruptcy courts in spite of jurisdictional or
statutory limitations suggested previously in this paragraph.31
Each of these theories is conclusionary; they are ways of rationalizing,
rather than reaching, a desired result. In total, they show a general willing-
ness on the part of courts to find a legal reason to enforce subordination
agreements. Where the parties have agreed to make an assignment, as in the
Handy-Andy case, the equitable assignment theory can be utilized. But Dodge-
Freedman indicates that the equitable assignment theory, as well as the close-
ly-related equitable lien theory, may not apply where the court feels that the
parties have failed explicitly to articulate an intent either to assign or to create
a lien. In this case, a constructive trust, which rests only on the relationship
of the parties and the "conscience of equity"3 2 can be invoked to legitimize
the desired result. No court has yet based its decision on the concept of a
resulting trust, but this brethren to the constructive trust might well prove
to be as successful a theory as its better-known kin.
The notion of the bankruptcy court using its equity power to enforce the
private contract of the parties has run head-on into two difficulties: one, a
matter of statutory interpretation and the other, a question of contracting
parties. First, the argument has been advanced 33 that subordination agree-
ments may not be enforced because the allocation of bankruptcy dividends
specified by the subordination agreement is inconsistent with the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act providing for pro rata dividends on claims. This argu-
ment has been consistently rejected. The courts have uniformly held that
subordination agreements creating priorities among debts are not inconsistent
with the Bankruptcy Act, are not contrary to public policy, and will be given
effect by the bankruptcy court through the exercise of its equity power. This
argument was first raised in the leading Bird & Sons case and emphatically
rejected by a unanimous court.34 In In re Aktiebolaget Kreugier & Toll the
31. 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 65.06 (14th ed. 1956).
32. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380
(1919) ; 4 ScOTT, TRUSTS § 462 (2d ed. 1956).
33. Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1935) ; In re Aktiebolaget
Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938) ; In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F.
Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
34. Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371, 373 (8th Cir. 1935):
[Appellant) contends that the order now presented for review is violative of sec-
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argument was rejected by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
as follows:
Section 64b of the Bankruptcy Act, . . . for reasons of public policy
creates priorities regardless of the parties' contracts and overrides incon-
sistent covenants. But this does not mean that the parties are prohibited
from making contracts for a priority or subordination in so far as they
do not impinge upon statutory priorities. Section 65a ... means no more
than that dividends paid to creditors shall be pro rata except when there
is a priority given by law or by lawful contractual arrangement between
the parties.8 5
In all the cases, no matter what the theory, the court directive that pay-
ment of dividends on the subordinated debt be paid to the senior debt holder
is made not on the basis of different ranks of claims but on the basis of the
recognition of contractual obligations or equitable liens or assignments in the
disposition of proceeds of claims of equal statutory rank. In other words, the
subordinated debt is proved on a parity with the senior debt.3
Second, the would-be senior debt holder will often base his claim for a
priority of payment on a written contract to which he is not a party.37 For
example, in the case of publicly issued subordinated debentures, the indenture
tion 65a of the Bankruptcy Act, [66 Stat. 426 (1952) ] 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) [(1958)],
which provides: 'Dividends of an equal percentum shall be declared and paid on all
allowed claims, except such as have priority or are secured.' Its theory is that the
Bankruptcy Act compels equality in the distribution of dividends to general cred-
itors and that section 65a defines and restricts the power of the court. In other
words, that when the claim of general creditors has been allowed section 65a estab-
lishes an inexorable rule for the distribution of the fund and the court is without
power to recognize rights, however just and equitable, which some members of the
class may be shown to have against others.
... [W]e are not persuaded that the powers of the bankruptcy court can be so
narrowly limited. The provisions of section 65a for the equal distribution of divi-
dends, when interpreted in the light of the broad equity powers granted the bank-
ruptcy court under sections 1 and 2 of the Bankruptcy Act [64 Stat. 1113 (1950)]
11 U.S.C. §§ 1, 11, [(1958)] do not preclude that court from considering such a
contract as was executed by appellant in this case, nor from applying equitable
principles to the situation presented. [Citing cases]. By its adjustment of the order
of payment the bankruptcy court conformed the distribution of the estate to accord
with the rights of the parties, as such rights were fixed by their own contract. The
contract violated no public policy nor the spirit of the bankruptcy law, but was
entered into by the appellant and relied upon by those who extended credit on the
faith of it in the hope that Barney Grosberg, Inc., could be maintained as a going
concern.
35. 96 F.2d 768, 770 (2d Cir. 1938).
36. On this point, the holding in lin re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc., 16 F.2d 289, 290
(S.D.N.Y. 1926) is instructive: "The order is affirmed, so far as it gives the nonjoining
creditor its full dividends, on the basis of allowing all claims at their face without priority."
37. In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938), and In re Asso-
ciated Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd sub noin. Elias v. Clarke,
143 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 778 (1944) are two cases involving subor-
dinated debentures. In the former case the appellant argued that the Bankruptcy Act pro-
hibited contractual agreements for subordination unless the creditor claiming the priority
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pursuant to which they are issued will not be executed by the senior creditor.
When the senior creditor is not a signatory party, courts have indicated their
willingness to utilize the principle of estoppel 38 or that of unilateral contract, 39
while in most states the third party beneficiary doctrine will fill the gap.
The third party beneficiary concept 40 has developed into a rule of law of
such consequence as to assure that unilateral subordination agreements, in-
tended to benefit then existing or subsequent senior creditors, will be enforced
in virtually all jurisdictions.41 Nevertheless, in drafting indenture subordina-
is a party to the contract or is the sole beneficiary or there is an estoppel. The court sum-
marily rejected this argument and applied the contract theory of enforcement.
38. In Londner v. Perlman, 129 App. Div. 93, 95-96, 113 N.Y.S. 420, 422 (1908), it
was held:
It was not necessary that the State Bank... should be directly a party to the agree-
ment to subordinate.... Upon the plainest principles of equity [the subordinating
creditor], or any one claiming under him, is now estopped from repudiating this
agreement.
39. As stated in Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Fairfield Gardens, Inc., 260 N.Y. 16, 21, 182
N.E. 231, 233 (1932):
The covenant contained in the so-called subordination agreement was, perhaps, not
enforceable at the time the instrument was executed. Then it was merely a promise
made without consideration, to induce Prudence Company, Inc., to make the loan
to be secured by a first mortgage. It became enforceable if and when the Prudence
Company, Inc., was induced thereby to made [sic] the stipulated loan. That is not
and cannot be disputed, and it is unnecessary to determine whether it became en-
forceable upon the theory that a promissory estoppel then arose, or a unilateral
contract in which promise to subordinate was given by one party in exchange for
the act of making the stipulated building loan by the other party. Such distinctions
would carry no consequences in this case, for on either theory the priority of plain-
tiff's mortgage depends upon proof that the mortgagor did the act which the promise
to subordinate called for.
See also 6 REmiNGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 2874, at 486 (5th ed. 1952)
Actually, subordination of the claims of one creditor as against another, whether
by contract or on the theory of estoppel in pais, involves no special bankruptcy law
but is an application of equity jurisprudence to the facts at hand.
40. The concept has less validity in Massachusetts where it is still anathema to the
courts. E.g., Mellen v. Whipple, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317 (1854) ; Cain's Lobster House,
Inc. v. Cain, 312 Mass. 512, 45 N.E.2d 397 (1942) ; Gustafson v. Doyle, 329 Mass. 473,
109 N.E.2d 465 (1952). However, the following clause, when added to the indenture pro-
viding for subordinated debentures, is thought to overcome the absence of the third party
beneficiary concept in Massachusetts:
The foregoing provisions constitute a continuing offer to all persons who, in reliance
upon such provisions, become the holders of, or continue to hold, Senior Indebted-
ness; and such provisions are made for the benefit of the holders of Senior Indebted-
ness, and such holders are hereby made obligees hereunder the same as if their
names were written herein as such, and they and/or each of them may proceed to
enforce such provisions.
41. See Note, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 406 (1957) for an excellent treatment of the entire
concept of contracts for the benefit of third parties. See generally RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS §§ 133-47 (1932) ; 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 347-403 (3d ed. 1959) ; 4 CoRBIN,
CONTRACTS §§ 772-855 (1951).
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tion provisions, counsel usually make explicit that the debenture holders in-
tend the subordination to benefit third parties (the holders of the senior in-
debtedness).
i
DRAFTING SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT THE SENIOR CREDITOR
Qualification of Senior Debt
The importance of making certain that the senior debt qualifies as such
within the limitations provided in the subordination agreement, indenture, or
other instrument creating or evidencing the subordinated debt cannot be over-
emphasized. It is not unusual to find that a subordination agreement contains
restrictions of various types as to the amount and nature of senior indebted-
ness, so that indebtedness maturing more (or less) than, say, nine months
from its date, indebtedness arising other than from borrowing, indebtedness
to lending institutions other than commercial banks or trust companies, in-
debtedness in excess of a stated amount, or even indebtedness other than that
issued under a specified indenture, would not qualify as senior indebtedness.
Only if the senior indebtedness falls within such limitations and conditions
would it be entitled to the benefit of the subordination. For example, should
an indenture provide for subordination to only $1,000,000 of senior indebted-
ness, it seems clear that no indebtedness in excess of that amount would
qualify as senior indebtedness. It is believed that this would be so even if a
senior creditor made a loan in excess of that amount in good faith on the
basis of representations of the debtor as to the amount of other senior in-
debtedness then outstanding.
The senior creditor would not be permitted, while not complying with the
express terms of the contract between the subordinator and the debtor, to
take advantage of that same contract. Furthermore, the exact wording of the
limitation provisions might well determine whether any part of an issue of
indebtedness in excess of the prescribed limit, either orignally or after sub-
sequently being paid down to the limit, would be entitled to the benefit of the
subordination.
Voting Rights
Assuming that the obligation owed to the senior creditor qualifies as a
senior debt under the agreement, the senior creditor will also want to protect
his position in any proceedings relating to financial distress of the debtor. A
provision in a subordination agreement giving the senior creditor the right
to express his wishes by voting the full amount of the subordinated debt in
any bankruptcy, reorganization, or other proceeding, including any meeting
of creditors of the debtor, is therefore an important one, both from the legal
and the economic points of view. Further, short of a proceeding under the
Bankruptcy Act, the senior creditor might well be outvoted at a creditors'
meeting in which the fate of the debtor will be determined. The subordinated
debt may be much larger than the senior debt and thus the subordinating
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creditors may well determine, against the wishes of the senior creditor,
whether or not the debtor should be put into a Chapter X or Chapter XI
proceeding or otherwise. 42
In the absence of specific provision, the senior creditor probably would not
have the right to vote the subordinated debt. In the somewhat analogous
situation of a pledge of stock, it is specifically provided under some state
statutes that the right to vote the pledged stock remains in the pledgor unless
certain action is taken by the parties. In New York, for example, it is pro-
vided that "except in cases of express trust, or in which other provision shall
have been made by written agreement between the parties . . ." the record
holder pledgee shall, upon demand by the pledgor and payment of the ex-
penses entailed, issue a proxy to vote the stock to the pledgor.43 Under the
Delaware statute, the right to vote pledged stock remains in the pledgor "un-
less in the transfer by the pledgor on the books of the corporation he has
expressly empowered the pledgee to vote thereon ... -44 If the right to vote
does not pass to the pledgee of stock when there has been an actual transfer
of the stock, it would seem that the mere subordination of debt, involving no
present transfer of the debt, would not pass the right to vote such debt to the
senior creditor.45
Prohibition against Involuntary Bankruptcy Proceedings
A relatively new clause used in subordination agreements (not yet detected
in corporate indentures) stipulates that the subordinator will not commence,
or join with any other creditor in commencing, any bankruptcy, reorganiza-
tion, or insolvency proceeding against the debtor. This clause is designed to
prevent small subordinating creditors from taking action contrary to the in-
terests of the senior creditor. For example, should the debtor get into finan-
cial difficulties and should the senior creditor be willing to carry on some sort
of "work-out" or "bailing-out" operation, the senior creditor would not want
a subordinator to precipitate a bankruptcy proceeding.
Altering the Senior Debt
The senior creditor may also desire to maintain flexibility by inserting in
the subordination agreement a specific provision permitting the senior cred-
42. In a Chapter X reorganization it is likely that the subordinated debt would be
put in a separate classification from that of other unsecured debts and would be voted
accordingly in adopting or rejecting the plan of reorganization. See 6 COLLIER, BANK-
RurT-cy § 9.10 (14th ed. 1947).
43. N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW § 47.
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 217 (1953).
45. But cf. Meinhard, Greeff & Co. v. Brown, 199 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1952) (where in
a reorganization proceeding the pledgee of a bond of a larger principal amount than the
debt it secured was limited to voting the bond only to the extent of the amount secured
by the pledge, with the right in the owner of the bond to vote the remainder of the debt
evidenced by it). *
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itor to extend, renew, or alter the terms of the senior debt or of any security
therefor and to release, sell, or exchange such security and otherwise to deal
freely with the debtor, all without notice to or consent of the subordinator
and without affecting the liabilities and obligations of the subordinator under
the subordination agreement. It is clear law that a surety or guarantor will
be released from his contract by any material alteration of the principal con-
tract, or by the creditor granting the debtor an extension of time for payment
or performance of the main obligation ;46 similarly, any voluntary release or
surrender of collateral held for the principal obligation would discharge the
surety or guarantor at least to the extent of the collateral released. 47 More-
over, the extension of time and the release of collateral operate to decrease
the value of the guarantor's equitable right of subrogation to the rights of
the creditor. Since in substance the subordinator is a guarantor to the extent
of the value of the subordinated debt, it could be argued by analogy to the
law of guaranty and suretyship that, at least in this area, the subordinator
should be protected in the same manner in which the law protects guarantors.
No cases have been found which apply the law of guaranty to subordination
problems, but the step would not be illogical. Just as a guarantor would be
adversely affected by the creditor's release of collateral security for the in-
debtedness guaranteed, so, too, would a subordinator be adversely affected
by the release by the senior creditor of the collateral security held for the
senior debt. To the extent that such collateral is not available to the senior
creditor in the event of the bankruptcy of the debtor, dividends on the sub-
ordinated debt must be used in making the senior creditor whole. In other
words, by giving up his collateral, the senior creditor makes it more likely
that if the debtor goes bankrupt, the senior creditor will have to satisfy the
obligation owed him by taking the junior creditor's dividends. It would there-
fore follow, in the absence of a provision permitting the senior creditor to
alter the terms of the debt or deal with the security therefor that the senior
creditor might be obligated to some extent to the subordinating creditor as to
the value of the collateral released.
This view would apply in all cases where the subordination is to a specified
senior indebtedness. On the other hand, it could be argued that this rigid rule
should not apply when the subordination is to any and all indebtedness, pres-
ent or future, secured or unsecured, incurred by the debtor. Where the sub-
ordinator has given carte blanche, so to speak, to the debtor, and agrees to
subordinate no matter what type of contract the debtor makes with the senior
creditor, it might well be urged that the subordinator has not asked for the
protection of the strict rules applicable to guaranty and suretyship. So, too, if
the subordination is to all indebtedness of a particular class, such as indebted-
ness to banks, insurance companies, and other financing institutions, an alter-
ation of the debt of that class within the limits of the class should not serve as
the basis for relieving the subordinator of its liabilities. Nevertheless, in the
46. STEARNS, SURETYSHIP § 6.1 (5th ed. 1951).
47, Id. § 6.46,
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absence of law on the subject, it would be in order to insert the suggested pro-
vision in all subordination agreements, if at all obtainable.
Assignment Versus Subordination
Probably the most misunderstood conceptual element of subordination
agreements concerns the question of the necessity of including an assignment
of the subordinated debt in the agreement. An examination of the subordi-
nation agreement forms used by large banks and trust companies (these forms
almost invariably provide for the complete type of subordination) reflects a
wide difference of opinion as to the propriety of such an assignment. At least
five different approaches to this question are evidenced by such forms: (1)
an express present assignment; (2) a covenant by the subordinator to give
an assignment on the demand of the senior creditor; (3) a covenant to give
an assignment immediately upon the occurrence of certain events; (4) an
assignment to take effect at the option of the senior bank creditor in certain
events; and (5) no provision as to assignment. Except in situations where
both the debtor and the subordinating creditor become bankrupt, no present
assignment of the subordinated debt is necessary. In all of the subordination
cases, except Matter of Goodman-Kinstler Cigar Co.,4 8 the subordination
agreement was given full force and effect, and in none of them did the agree-
ment contain an assignment of the subordinator's claim. Moreover, in the
Handy-Andy case 4 0 the need for an assignment was adverted to and rejected.
Indeed, an actual assignment of the subordinated debt as collateral security
for the senior debt obviates the need for the subordination itself, or for any
of the implementing provisions of the typical complete subordination agree-
ment in so far as existing debt is concerned. If the subordinated debt were
so assigned, the holder of the senior debt would have the full benefit of such
subordinated debt and any dividends on it. The holder of the senior debt,
having been given in the assignment or pledge instrument the power to file
proof of claim upon the collateral, could, without benefit of any subordination
agreement, take whatever steps are necessary to protect its interests. The
only benefit of the subordination agreement in this situation would be to cover
any additional subordinated debt which might have arisen after the date of
the subordination agreement and which was not specifically assigned.
Only in the rare instance where both the principal debtor and the sub-
ordinating creditor become bankrupt would an actual assignment of the sub-
ordinated debt be beneficial. A subordination agreement does not constitute
a present legal transfer, and in the absence of such a transfer the subordinat-
ing creditor's trustee in bankruptcy might be able to take title to the subor-
dinated debt free and clear of all equitable or contractual rights created by
the subordination agreement. Under § 70c of the Bankruptcy Act,5° the so-
48. 32 Am. Bankr. R. 624 (S.D. Cal. 1914).
49. 2 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1932).
50. 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1958).
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called "strong-arm" clause, the trustee is deemed vested as of the date of
bankruptcy with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then hold-
ing a lien on all the bankrupt's property, whether or not such creditor actual-
ly exists.51 The claim of the trustee to the subordinated debt, as a lien cred-
itor, might thus be regarded as superior to the unsecured right of the senior
creditor. No cases have been found involving the bankruptcy of the subordi-
nator. There are, however, many cases in which trustees in bankruptcy have
prevailed over equitable rights created by bankrupts and running in favor of
third persons. 52
On the other hand, as Collier states :5
The trustee generally will take the bankrupt's property subject to such
equities or equitable interests as are created by the situations wherein
the bankrupt, either expressly, impliedly or constructively, is holding
property in trust for others. Where the bankrupt holds funds or other
property impressed with a trust, the strong-arm clause of § 70c is usually
of no more effect in securing the title thereto for the trustee than are
the broader provisions of § 70a(5). The reason is that lien creditors are
generally not entitled to prevail against beneficiaries of a trust, and by
virtue of § 70c the trustee in bankruptcy has, at most, the rights of a lien
creditor under the applicable state law.54
Since the matter is not clearly resolved, it seems that the only way to avoid
the question is to include a present assignment of the subordinated debt in
the subordination agreement. If this is done, a legal transfer of the then exist-
ing indebtedness to the subordinator takes place on the date of the subordi-
nation agreement. The senior creditor, as a prior assignee, would therefore
unquestionably prevail over the trustee.5 5 A present assignment would also
51. Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 66 Stat. 420 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)
(1958) provides:
The trustee may have the benefit of all defenses available to the bankrupt as against
third persons, including statutes of limitation, statutes of frauds, usury, and other
personal defenses; and a waiver of any such defense by the bankrupt after bank-
ruptcy shall not bind the trustee. The trustee, as to all property, whether or not
coming into possession or control of the court, upon which a creditor of the bank-
rupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of
bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies,
and powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether
or not such a creditor actually exists.
52. Rosenbaum v. Century Indem. Co., 168 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1948) (trustee prevailed
over equitable lien) ; Titusville Iron Co. v. City of New York, 207 N.Y. 203, 100 N.E.
806 (1912) ; Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907) ; Corney v.
Saltzman, 22 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1927) (trustee prevailed over pledgee or mortgagee of
after-acquired property) ; F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. Amsterdam Tavern, Inc., 171
Misc. 352, 12 N.Y.S.2d 701 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Atlas Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Casa
Cubana, Inc., 259 App. Div. 951, 19 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1940) (trustee prevailed over equitable
assignment).
53. 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 70.62, at 1491 (14th ed. 1959).
54. See, e.g., In re Berry, 147 Fed. 208 (2d Cir. 1906).
55. Even if the transfer were fraudulent as to creditors of the subordinator under
§ 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, 66 Stat. 428-29 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1958), the
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serve to protect the assignee from the fraud of the subordinator making a
second assignment of the subordinated debt.
In passing, it should be noted that even if an outright assignment is in-
cluded in a subordination agreement, so that it clearly constitutes a present
transfer of assets, such assets are not being transferred to prefer one creditor
of the subordinator over other creditors, and, therefore, the assignment will
not constitute a preference under § 60a of the Bankruptcy Act.
Whether, in the rare situation involving the bankruptcy of both the debtor
and the subordinating creditor, the benefit to the bank in having a present
assignment outweighs the reluctance on the part of subordinating creditors
to give such an assignment is a matter which individual bankers can best
determine for themselves. The following are some of the factors which should
be considered in making any such determination:
(1) As a practical matter, many subordinators might well object to an
assignment as collateral security, with the concomitant right in the holder of
the senior debt, either provided in the instrument itself or by law, to fore-
close on the security in the event of default on the senior debt, whereas they
might not object to a subordination agreement which leaves the subordinated
debt to some extent within their own control.
(2) In many cases an assignment of the subordinated debt as collateral
security might contravene the terms of a negative pledge covenant between
the subordinating creditor and his creditor, whereas a typical subordination
agreement not containing words of present assignment would not. 6
(3) In the usual complete subordination agreement, where both present
and future indebtedness owing by the debtor to the subordinator is subordi-
nated, an assignment would be effective in law only as to the subordinated
trustee would not prevail if a period of one year had elapsed between the date of the sub-
ordination agreement and the bankruptcy of the subordinator. As a practical matter, a
fraudulent transfer of the type provided for in § 67(d) would be inapplicable except in
very rare instances, for the reason that the subordinator usually has a valid business
reason for executing a subordination agreement. However, as a matter of law, there might
be a serious question as to whether the subordinator could be said to have received a fair
equivalent for such an agreement, and if the subordination agreement should be held to
constitute a transfer, the possibility of a fraudulent conveyance within the meaning of
§ 67(d) might be present. 1
56. For example, if the subordinator as a borrower under a bank loan or credit agree-
ment has covenanted not to create or suffer to exist any mortgage, pledge, lien, charge,
encumbrance, assignment, or transfer upon or of any of its property or assets, an assign-
ment of the subordinated debt would appear to be in violation of such a negative pledge
clause. A subordination, without assignment language, would not appear to be such a vio-
lation. Query whether the execution of a subordination agreement containing a covenant
to give an assignment on the demand of the senior creditor or upon the occurrence of a
stated event would violate a negative pledge covenant of the subordinator. There are no
known cases on the matters mentioned in this footnote. See generally Kelly v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) for an interesting case
containing both general and specific observations on a nega.tive pledge clause.
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debt actually in existence at the time, and as to future indebtedness would
constitute only an equitable assignment. To obtain a legal assignment of the
future indebtedness the subordination agreement would have to provide for
supplemental assignments of additional debt as such debt comes into exist-
ence.
57
(4) A present assignment would be completely inappropriate in the in-
choate subordination which presupposes effectuation at some future date.
(5) If the subordinated debt is presently assigned as collateral security
for the senior indebtedness, with power given to the senior creditor to file
proof of claim against the estate in bankruptcy of the debtor, the responsi-
bility of performing all acts necessary to file the claim and collect the divi-
dends thereon would devolve on the senior creditor. rm
(6) There should be no real concern that the assignment will prejudice
the senior creditor's rights in bankruptcy. Section 57h of the Bankruptcy Act
provides that a secured creditor must deduct the value of his collateral and
prove only on the unpaid balance of his claim. But under section 1(28) of
the Bankruptcy Act a "secured creditor" is defined as one who has security
for his debt "upon the property of the bankrupt." It seems clear that the
assignment of the subordinated debt to the senior creditor as security involves
security coming from a third person and is not security upon the property
of the bankrupt which must be deducted.
Restrictions on the Subordinating Creditor
Amendments to Subordination Agreements. It is usual to find provisions
in indentures or other instruments creating or evidencing subordinated debt
that they may not be amended so as to affect or impair the provisions provid-
ing for the subordination. From the senior creditor's point of view, such a
provision is desirable because, in the absence of other controlling considera-
tions, the parties to an agreement ma; amend it. Although the courts would
probably sustain the rights of senior debt created in reliance on the unamended
subordination, either on the ground of estoppel or that equities or rights had
vested in the holder of the senior debt which would enable him to prevent an
amendment injurious to his position, the courts might well have some diffi-
culty in so holding if the indenture itself allowed for amendments. What
would be the result if an indenture providing for the subordination of securi-
ties issued thereunder was amended by the junior creditor and the debtor to
impair or destroy the subordination, new securities were issued which did
not refer to the subordination, and such new securities were sold to a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice? Such purchaser might well obtain
rights equal to those of the senior debt holder.
57. See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 413 (rev. ed. 1936). RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 154 (1932).
58. A typical exculpation clause would give the senior creditor some measure of pro-
tection in failing to properly perform this responsibility.
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Securing Subordinated Debt. Protection of the senior creditor may also
require that he prohibit the subordinator from taking any security for the
subordinated debt. If security is given for subordinated debt after the senior
debt has been created, the subsequent payment of the subordinated debt out
of that security might be sustained by the courts, on the theory that an effec-
tive lien securing the subordinated debt had been legally created. Since the
subordinated debt could then be collected out of the security, rather than out
of bankruptcy dividends for unsecured creditors, the senior creditor would
lose his contemplated right to the dividends due the subordinator. Accord-
ingly, from the point of view of the senior creditor the only safe procedure is
to require a provision prohibiting the giving of such security or, as an alter-
native, a provision that payments on the subordinated debt out of the proceeds
of security are to be treated as if made out of general assets of the debtor.
In the latter case it would follow that such payments could not be made with-
out violating the subordination provisions. However, since an inchoate sub-
ordination does not usually prohibit payment of principal of the subordinated
debt prior to the time that the subordination becomes operative, it is some-
what inconsistent, when dealing with an inchoate agreement, to prohibit the
giving of security for the subordinated debt prior to such time.
Converting Subordinated Debt. Senior creditors should also be cognizant
of the consequences of provisions permitting conversion of subordinated debt
into capital stock. As a result of the exercise by debenture holders, for ex-
ample, of their options to convert subordinated debentures, the theretofore
subordinators would now be stockholders, rather than unsecured creditors,
and would not share in the debtor's assets with the senior debt in the event
of a distribution to creditors. The senior debt would thus fail to receive the
dividends that would have been paid to these subordinating creditors.
Assignment of Subordinated Debt. The senior creditor must also be wary
of the junior creditor assigning his claim. A carefully prepared subordina-
tion agreement should thus prohibit any transfer, assignment, or pledge of
the subordinated debt unless such transfer, assignment, or pledge is made
expressly subject to the subordination. This is desirable even though as a
matter of law it would seem that any transfer of what is in fact subordinated
debt could not affect the subordination. 59 Some subordination agreements
prohibit any transfer of the subordinated debt. If the subordinated debt were
evidenced by a negotiable instrument which was sold to a bona fide purchaser
for value, 'who purchased without notice of the subordination, the purchaser
would take free of the subordination. 0 In the light of these circumstances,
it appears to be desirable that a reference to..the, fact of subordination .be
made within the body of the subordinated debt instrument or, in the alter-
native, a legend as to subordination should be typed or stamped on such in-
strument.
59. See 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 432 (rev. ed. 1936).
60. See BRITTON, BILLS AND Nors § 100 (1943).
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Subrogation Clauses
While many of the above provisions are necessary to protect the senior
creditor, al additional clause is frequently provided to protect the junior cred-
itor. Thus, subordination agreements often contain a provision specifically
stating that after payment in full of the senior debt, the subordinator shall
be subrogated to the rights of the senior creditor to receive payments or dis-
tributions of assets of the debtor made on the senior debt. Such provisions
are most usually found in subordinated debenture issues, but apply equally
in the typical bank form of subordination agreement. The subordinating cred-
itor should be subrogated to the rights of the senior creditor in respect to that
portion of the senior debt which has, in fact, been paid, not from dividends
on the senior debt as such, but from dividends on the subordinated debt. For
example, assume that the senior creditor is paid 60 per cent of the debt by
reason of dividends on its own claim and that the balance of 40 per cent of
the senior debt is paid by reason of the application of the dividends on the
subordinated debt. The subordinating creditor should then be subrogated to
the senior creditor's right to receive payment of that 40 per cent of the senior
debt. In other words, although by reason of the subordination the senior debt
will receive "double dividends"-the dividends payable ol the senior debt
and those payable on the subordinated debt-as between the debtor and the
senior creditor, only 60 per cent of the senior debt has been paid. Therefore,
after the senior debt has thus been paid in full, the subordinated debt will
then receive double dividends-dividends on the subordinated debt and divi-
dends on the 40 per cent of the senior debt which was paid by the application
thereto of the subordinated debt dividends. Even if a provision specifically
covering the point is not used, it is clear that the doctrine of equitable sub-
rogation would apply.6
REMAINING LEGAL PROBLEMS
Even with careful drafting and inclusion of the suggested provisions for
promoting flexibility and protection of both the senior and junior creditors,
various legal problems will arise.
One Debt, Two Subordinations
For example, there may come into being two subordinations of the very
same debt, in which case it would seem that the first subordination agreement
in point of time would prevail over a second subordination agreement, on the
theory that the second subordination agreement covers a debt already sub-
61. See RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 162 (1937):
Where property of one person is used in discharging an obligation owed by an-
other or a lien upon the property of another, under such circumstances that the
other would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefit thus conferred, the
former is entitled to be subrogated to the position of the obligee or lien-holder.
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ordinated. The maxim of equity-"between equal equities the first in order
of time prevails"-should also apply to such a situation.6 2 Further, one may
look to the law of assignments for analogy. Under the law of New York and
of many other jurisdictions, the first assignee prevails over a subsequent as-
signee whether the assignment is regarded as creating a legal or equitable
right in the assignee.0 3
Corporate Power to Subordinate
Moreover, because the subordinator may be viewed as a guarantor of the
senior debt, where the subordinating creditor is a corporation it would seem
that the same ultra vires problems which apply in guaranty situations should
by analogy apply in the subordination field. Thus, just as it is usually con-
sidered that a parent has the power to guarantee the obligation of its sub-
sidiary, 4 so, too, should a parent have the power to subordinate its right to
payment as a creditor of the subsidiary. The reverse situation should be the
same both as to guaranties and subordinations-that is, just as "upstream"
guaranties (the guaranty by a subsidiary of its parent's obligation) may be
ultra vires 65 so, too, may "upstream" subordinations be ultra vires. Similar-
ly, in both fields, "crossstream" guaranties and subordinations (involving
commonly owned or affiliated corporations) might well be held ultra vires.
In the guaranty field, the courts have usually held that if there is a business
reason for the execution of a guaranty, a consideration commensurate with
the risks involved, the guaranty will be upheld.66 The entire area concerning
adequate consideration, statutory and charter permissions, stockholders' con-
sents and absence of the likelihood of creditor attack as it pertains to the field
of guaranty might serve as an analogy in resolving these same problems as
they apply in the subordination field. 67
Subordination by a Partner
A subordination by a partner of indebtedness owing by the partnership
(other than for profits or such partner's contlibution to capital) would not
result in the senior creditor receiving dividends on'both the subordinated debt
owed to the partner and the senior obligation. This is so because by the
62. 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 413-15 (5th ed. 1941).
63. Se6 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 435 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 173 (1932).
64. 6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CO.PORATIONS § 2593 (rev. ed. 1950).
65. Cf. In re John B. Rose Co., 275 Fed. 416 (2d Cir. 1921);, Robert Gair Co. v.
Columbia Rice Packing Co., 124 La. 193, 50 So. 8 (1909) ; In ie Gilchrist Co., 278 Fed.
235 (D.C. Mass. 1922), aff'd sub norn., Win. Filene's Sons Co. v. Gilchrist Co., 284 Fed.
664 (1st Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 750 (1923); Bayou Drilling Co. v. Baillio,
312 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
66. 6 FLuTCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS §§ 2591, 2596 (rev. ed. 1950).
67. See 6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONs ch. 26 (rev. 1950).
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specific provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act,6 8 after "dissolution" of
a general partnership (which could be caused by the bankruptcy of any part-
ner or the partnership or the insolvency of either under any state insolvency
act) ,69 all claims of nonpartner creditors against the partnership must be paid
in full before any distribution will be made on a debt claim of a partner.70
Thus, the senior creditor would not receive the dividends paid on the junior
debt because the senior creditor would already have been paid in full before
any dividends could be paid on the partner's claim. However, the usual type
of bank subordination agreement (i.e., complete subordination) would benefit
the bank because it prohibits payment of the partner's claim prior to payment
of the senior indebtedness, and thus keep assets in the partnership which
might otherwise be paid out to the partner. Such a subordination agreement
would also prohibit the transfer of the partner's claim to a nonpartner, unless
the claim transferred remained expressly subject to the subordination agree-
ment. Therefore, even though the claim might be elevated to the rank of a non-
partner claim by reason of the transfer,71 the bank's right of subordination
would continue; indeed the bank's right would become more valuable, for the
nonpartner claim would be entitled to dividends which would pass to the
bank.
Subordination by a general partner of his debt claim against a limited part-
nership is much the same, although in this case the statutory rank of the
partner's claim is also below the claims of limited partners in respect of their
capital contributions.72
A limited partner's debt claim against a limited partnership ranks equally
with claims of nonpartner creditors, 73 and therefore the subordination of such
a claim would entitle the bank to receive "double dividends," assuming that
there is nothing in the partnership articles altering the ranking of the limited
partner's debt claim.74
Trust Indenture Act Disgorging Provision
A bank lender may become both a trustee (on behalf of all holders of sub-
ordinated debentures) under the terms of a subordinated indenture and also
the holder of senior indebtedness of the obligor. As a result of two separate
68. The Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted in thirty-eight States and the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act in thirty-nine. The acts as adopted in certain States
contain variations from the uniform act.
69. UNIF RM PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 2, 31.
70.. Id. § 40; In re Effinger, 184 Fed. 728 (D.C. Md. 1911). See also Brandt & Brandt
Printers, Inc. v. Klein, 220 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1955).
71. See First Nat'l Bank v. Wood, 128 N.Y. 35, 27 N.E. 1020 (1891).
72. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHip AcT §§ 23(1) (c), -(d).
73. Id. §§ 13(1), 23(1)(a).
74. In both Missouri and Louisiana, however, a limited partner's debt claim against
the limited partnership ranks below claims of nonpartner creditors. See case notes follow-
ing i& § 23.
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transactions, with the same debtor, therefore, the bank will be both senior
creditor and also trustee for the junior creditors. But to qualify under the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 the indenture must contain the "disgorging"
provisions required by section 311 (a).75 Such provisions provide in substance
that, when a payment is made by the obligor to the bank in "reduction" of
the bank's claim as senior creditor within four months of a default in payment
of the senior debt by the obligor, the bank shall set aside an equal amount in
a special account for the pro rata benefit of the bank and the debenture
holders. Put simply, the Trust Indenture Act requires that when the bank
acts in this dual capacity of trustee-senior creditor, the money it receives on
its claim as creditor during this four month period must be shared with the
debenture holders. This provision does not apply to bankruptcy dividends.
When bankruptcy of the obligor occurs, the act allows the bank to retain for
its own account dividends which it receives on its claim filed as senior cred-
itor. Moreover, the bank will be allowed to assert its right under the subor-
dination agreement to receive dividends paid on the claims of the debenture
holders. Dividends to the junior creditors do not constitute a "reduction" of
the bank's claim as senior creditor, and thus would not fall within the pur-
view of the disgorging provisions.
A real question might exist, however, as to any payment the bank might
receive on its individual claim as senior creditor within the above-mentioned
four months' period. The disgorging provisions would clearly seem to require
the bank, as the indenture trustee, to set apart the amount received in a special
account for the pro rata benefit of the debenture holders and the bank as
creditor. A pro rata share of the money set aside by the trustee would then
be paid to the debenture holders. In the usual subordinated indenture situa-
tion, payments from the debtor to the junior creditors must be turned over
to the senior creditor. But the typical subordinated indenture requires only
that the debenture holders turn over payments or distributions "of assets
of the Company." The amount distributed pro rata to the debenture holders
would not, according to strict interpretation of the subordination provisions,
constitute a payment or distribution "of assets of the Company." Thus, the
debenture holders would retain for their own account amounts which the in-
denture trustee was required to turn over to them through the operation of
the disgorging provisions.
Two arguments could be made against this literal interpretation of the
disgorging and subordination provisions. First, such an interpretation would
have the practical effect of preventing a bank from being both an individual
creditor and an indenture trustee, which is not the purpose of the Trust In-
75. 53 Stat. 1161 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77kkk (1958). Section 318 of the Trust In-
denture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1173 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77rrr (1958) further requires that
the indenture provide that "if any provision thereof limits, qualifies, or conflicts with an-
other provision which is required to be included in such indenture by any of sections 310
to 317, inclusive, such required provision shall control."
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denture Act. Rather, assuming that the bank does act in this dual capacity,
the act, through the operation of the disgorging provisions, seeks only to
prevent the bank from keeping the advantage of "preferential collection of
claims" against the obligor company. Second, if the literal language of the
disgorging and subordination provisions is followed, there ensues the some-
what peculiar result that the bank may have to disgorge to the debenture
holders an amount received in payment of its individual claim shortly prior
to bankruptcy even though it would be permitted to retain such amount if
received during bankruptcy. Not only does such a result go far beyond the
ostensible intent of the act, but it is contradictory to the express subordination
by the debenture holders.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL












































CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
HARRY H. WELLINGTON. A.B. 1947, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1952, Harvard
University. Professor of Law, Yale University.
DEE MARTIN CALI GAR. Ph.B. 1945, University of Wisconsin; LL.B. 1949, Columbia
University. Member of the New York Bar.
